Abstract: We explore the evolution of market access conditions in the textile and clothing sectors (T&C). Working with bilateral trade data on textile and clothing trade, underlying tariffs, and the coverage of quotas under the WTO's Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) we first develop a non-linear least squares estimation framework for calculating the tax equivalent of ATC quota restrictions on bilateral trade. We also compare these non-tariff barrier estimates to earlier estimates for the years since the inception of the ATC, to gauge the extent to which the ATC has actually led to quota liberalization.
Introduction
The Ministerial Declaration at Punta Del Este that launched the Uruguay Round stated that the "Negotiations in the area of textiles and clothing shall aim to formulate modalities that would permit the eventual integration of this sector into GATT on the basis of strengthened GATT rules and disciplines." In plain language, this means that quotas on textiles and clothing were to be eliminated. The negotiations launched at Punta Del Este led to the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), an attempt to end almost 40 years of discriminatory protection in violation of the basic precepts of the GATT system. Details on the subsequent evolution of the system are provided in Table 1. [ Table 1 about here] By the start of the 1970s, it had become apparent that the multiplicity of makeshift arrangements protecting the T&C industries would have to be replaced. Ultimately the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) was agreed upon and put into effect as of 1/1/1974. Its product coverage was extended to non-cotton textiles and clothing. The final MFA (i.e. # IV) was extended several times until the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing as an integrated part of the Uruguay Round agreement came into force.
Like the preceding arrangements, the MFA provided rules for the imposition of quotas, either through bilateral agreements or unilateral actions, when surges of imports cause market disruption, or the threat thereof, in importing countries. In the years leading up to the Uruguay Round Agreements, six developed participants actively applied quotas under the MFA -the EU, the U.S., Canada, Norway, Finland and Austria. These were applied almost exclusively on imports from developing countries. Sweden liberalized its textile and clothing regime in 1991 and withdrew from the MFA agreement. However, it effectively rejoined this regime when it joined the European Union. Two other developed country participants, Japan and Switzerland, did not impose MFA quotas, but instead restricted themselves to "signalling" a readiness to apply quotas by the act of being signatories to the MFA agreement, combined with (active) import surveillance. As shown by Winters (1994) , import surveillance can, at least in concentrated industries, induce a fall in import levels as producers are trying to forestall explicit quotas. The restrictiveness of the applied MFA quotas, since replaced by the ATC regime, varies from product to product, and from supplier to supplier, and aggregate measures are highly uncertain.
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) has required a gradual phase out of the quota restrictions carried over from the MFA regime, as detailed in Table 2 . The integration of the products covered by the agreement was to be achieved in three stages under a ten-year transition period. The first stage called for the integration of products comprising not less than 16 percent of the total volume of each member's 1990 imports of the products listed in the annex to the Agreement. The second stage, beginning in year 4, required the integration of a further 17 percent. The third stage, beginning in year 8, required that another 18 percent of imports be brought under normal GATT rules.
[ Table 2 about here.] Unfortunately, each importing country was free to choose the products it would integrate at each stage, the only constraint being that they had to encompass products from each of the four groupings: tops and yarn, fabrics, made-up textile products, and clothing. Products that remained restricted during the transition period were to benefit from a progressively increasing quota. The previously applied MFA quota annual growth rates were to be scaled up by a factor of 16 percent in the first stage -for instance, from 3% to (3×1.16 =) 3.48%
-an additional 25 percent in the second stage, and yet another 27 percent in the third stage.
This turned a 3% initial annual growth rate to 5.52% in the third stage.
In theory, at the end of the ten-year transition period, all remaining quantitative restrictions on textiles and clothing (carried over from the MFA regime) are to be terminated.
The process was meant to be smooth, with a gradual phase-out of restrictions. In reality, there has been worry in policy communities that much of the quota liberalization has been backloaded until the very end of the 10-year phase-in period. This is due partly to disingenuous graduation (i.e. the graduation of products not actually restricted) in the first phases of the ATC.
Quota Rents and Effective Preference Erosion
In addition to backloading, an additional area of concern related to the implementation of the ATC and associated Uruguay Round MFN-tariff reductions has been the scope for preference erosion, especially for the least developed African countries. Virtually all African countries have entered into contractual preference arrangements with the European Union, and obtain preferential treatment for certain exports in the United States and Japan, as well as in other developed country markets under GSP schemes. 1 There has consequently been a concern that implementation of the market access results of the Uruguay Round would diminish rather than augment their trade and economic prospects (Blackhurst et al 1996) .
The actual scope for general preference erosion for African Lomé (now Cotonou)
countries is very limited. Over half of the EU's imports from African countries are petroleum and other fuels, already bound duty-free, and agricultural and industrial products divide the rest. Access for industrial products is the main area where the EU's MFN-tariff reductions will have any impact. Even here, almost three-quarters of African exports to the European
Union already enter at rates of less than 3 per cent, and this percentage will rise to 80 per cent. For these products, the margin of preference afforded under Lomé is likely to be consumed in large part by associated administrative costs.
2
Though not through tariffs, there is scope for relative preference erosion of another sort under the ATC. This is because at the start of the ATC phase-out, some countries and regions faced much greater restrictions than others. The lower-income suppliers in India and elsewhere in South Asia, in particular, faced negative preferences, in the sense that they faced greater effective restrictions than suppliers from East Asia and elsewhere. The distributional effect of the MFA restrictions was thus to discriminate between developing countries, and against suppliers like India and Pakistan. Even where some least developed countries were favoured by preferential access, this was been largely at the expense of other least developed countries.
1
The ACP-EC Fourth Lomé Convention covers Sub-Saharan African countries with the exception of South Africa and "free trade" agreements cover North African countries. These arrangements are detailed in GATT (1993a, pp. 44-46) . In 1993, about two-thirds of Africa's exports were shipped to the European Union. The Lomé Convention has since been renegotiated/replaced.
2
The Uruguay Round negotiating group on market access considered that tariffs at or below 3 per cent were "nuisance" tariffs. Herin (1986) [ Table 3 and 4 about here.]
The pattern that emerges is as follows. The elimination of ATC quotas, and the accession of China to the WTO, means that textile and clothing trade is likely to shift dramatically toward both China, and also the Indian sub-continent. The MFA and ATC have, in effect, been serving as a negative preference system, helping other developing country suppliers at the expense of these two potentially dominant suppliers. The system of preferences in place on tariffs will, to some extent, compensate for the loss of implicit margins provided by the ATC quotas. However, we can also expect that, with further reductions in T&C tariffs under Doha negotiations, the shift of T&C trade will be accelerated. The next section examines the magnitude of T&C quota wedges, and their evolution since the end of the Uruguay Round.
A Quantitative Assessment of ATC Quota Margins
We next turn to an estimation of the price effects of the ATC quotas. Our data are for the value of bilateral trade in textiles and in clothing between the high-income OECD countries 3 Because of agricultural product exclusions, the joke has been that this is better called Everything but Farms.
as importers and 86 countries and regions as exporters. 4 We also have data on tradeweighted tariffs (adjusted for trade preferences as well as we can) for this set of importerexporter pairings. Trade data are drawn from GTAP6, while protection data come from a mix of WTO, UNCTAD, and CEPII data on tariffs, augmented to reflect U.S. preference schemes in the Western hemisphere.
Our approach is to first assume CES import demand. From the first order conditions, this implies the following as a functional determinant of imports of good x from country i and into country j.
In equation (1), P ij is the price of x ij while P j is the CES price index, E j is country j expenditure on all imports of x and σ is the elasticity of substitution. From equation (1), relative import demands can then be written as a function of relative prices and CES expenditure weights α . This is shown in equation (2).
In equation (2), the τ term is a composite of any factors driving a wedge between world prices P * and internal prices P.
To arrive at our estimating equation, we take logs of equation (2), and add terms for tariffs (1+ t) and ATC quota price margins Ω in place of the generic trading cost term τ.
This yields equation (3)
.
where Ω ≥ 1
We estimate equation (3) using non-linear least squares, on the assumption that relative expenditure weights are comparable across OECD countries, once we control for trading costs. This involves minimizing equation (3), including the imposition of our lower bounds on the Ω terms and our assumption about the α terms, as shown in equation (4).
In equation (4), the error terms are indexed over the set of possible exporter pairings ik. We have implemented the estimation problem in GAMS.
The regression results and the estimated values of the Ω coefficients are reported in Tables 5 and 6 .
[ Tables 5 and 6 about here] ATC coefficients are only reported for countries where quotas are actually in place, and where such quotas are at least 50% filled across some product categories. Hence we do not measure the impact of monitoring or similar regimes. We have estimated these values both with an unrestricted substation elasticity (i.e. where we estimate the substitution elasticity σ in addition to the ATC coefficients and expenditure weights) and also with the additional restriction that the substitution elasticities equal the new set of GTAP elasticities (Hertel, Hummels, Ivanic and Keeney 2003). While we reject this restriction based on an F-test, these values are relevant for those working with the standard GTAP model and parameter set.
The ATC coefficients are converted to ad valorem equivalents in Table 7 [ Tables 7 and 8 about here]
Summary and Conclusions
The paper has examined the evolution of the ATC through 2001. The ATC quotas have been in phase-out mode since 1995. A key message from these calculations is that the problem of China's (PRC) T&C sector integration has been deferred. This means that the potential still exists for a substantial surge in China's exports after 2005. Such a surge in Chinese exports would of course mean lost market share for most other developing countries. Of course, this will only happen if other economies do not attempt to take advantage of specific contingent protection rules included in China's protocol of accession. These permit other WTO members to keep protectionist pressure up against China (PRC) for 15 years. They cover special antisurge clauses for T&C products (4 years), general anti-surge clauses (12 years) and treatment of China as "a non-market economy" in antidumping cases (15 years). Icing the cake is the fear that anti-dumping measures against China (PRC) will also be on the increase. The pattern of ATC quotas across regions suggest that the next few years will be very interesting indeed. 
1963-64
The United States tries and fails to secure an international agreement on wool products.
1965: June
The United States tries and fails to negotiate restraints on Japanese wool products.
1966: June
The United Kingdom implements a global quota scheme in violation of the LTA -the LTA providing only for product-specific restraints.
1967: April Agreement is reached to extend the LTA for three years.
1969-71
United States negotiates VERs with Asian suppliers on wool and man-made fibers.
1970: October
Agreement is reached to extend the LTA for three years. It was later extended three months more, to fill the gap until the MFA came into effect.
1973: December
The MFA is agreed, to commence January 1, 1974, and to last for four years.
1977: July-December The European Economic Community and the United States negotiate bilateral agreements with developing countries prior to agreeing to extension of the MFA.
1977: December
The MFA is extended for four years.
1981: December
The MFA is renewed for five years. The USA, under pressure from increased imports resulting from dollar appreciation, negotiates tough quotas.
1986: July
The MFA is extended for 5 years, to conclude with Uruguay Round.
1991: July
The MFA is extended pending outcome of the Uruguay Round negotiations.
1993: December
The Uruguay Round (UR) draft final act provides for a 10-year phase-out of all MFA and other quotas on textiles in ATC. MFA extend until UR comes into force.
1995: January 1 1st ATC tranche liberalized by importing countries -16% of 1990 import volume.
1998: January 1 2nd ATC tranche liberalized by importing countries -17% of 1990 import volume. Tables 3 and 4. 
